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1. A priori principles in the epistemology of modality 
 
It is widely thought that the epistemology of (metaphysical) modality is in some sense 
a priori. Examples of the necessary a posteriori due to Saul Kripke (1971, 1980) and 
others decisively refuted the simplest idea in the vicinity: that what is necessary is al-
ways an a priori matter. To use a familiar example, it is necessary, but it is not a priori 
that it is necessary, that Hesperus is Phosphorus. Nevertheless, it is still widely 
thought that there is some fairly substantive sense in which the epistemology of mo-
dality is a priori. 
Post-Kripkean advocates of a priori modal epistemology have tended to pro-
pose variants of the following principle (schema).2 
 
(*) If S knows whether it is contingent whether 𝜑, then S is in a position to know 
a priori whether it is contingent whether 𝜑. 
 
Albert Casullo considers the existence of reasons to accept a close variant of (*), (**), 
to be ‘the central question of modal epistemology’ (2018: 2).3 
 
(**) If it is necessary that 𝜑 and S knows that it is not contingent whether 𝜑, then S 
is in a position to know a priori that it is not contingent whether 𝜑. 
 
According to Casullo (2010: 357–58), (**) is an ‘intuitively plausible, widely accept-
ed principle that […] faces no clear counterexamples’.4 
                                               
1 We would like to thank Beau Madison Mount, Jens Kipper, and an anonymous referee for helpful 
discussions and comments. This work was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. 
2 See, e.g., Casullo (2003: 195-96, 2010: 348, 357-58), Gregory (2011: 7) and Hale (2013: 259). 
3 In his words: ‘Here we face the central question of modal epistemology: Is there any reason to en-
dorse (KB)’, i.e., (**)? (Casullo 2018: 2). 
4 We take (**) to be the most charitable reconstruction of Casullo’s (2010, 2018) principles, which 
differ even among themselves. According to his 2010 principle, if 𝜑 is necessary and S knows that 𝜑 is 
noncontingent, then S can know a priori that 𝜑 is contingent. This principle is plausibly too weak if ‘S 
can know’ is interpreted as ‘It is metaphysically possible that S knows’ (why should it not be metaphys-
ically possible?); we thus assume Casullo has something more like ‘S in a position to know’ in mind. 
According to his 2018 principle, if 𝜑 is necessary and S knows that 𝜑 is noncontingent, then S knows a 
priori that 𝜑 is noncontingent. We take this principle to be too strong to be of much interest. Nothing 
rules out someone knowing a posteriori, e.g. by testimony, that 𝜑 is noncontingent. 
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 Kripke suggests that his own examples of the necessary a posteriori conform 
to both (*) and (**): 
 
All the cases of the necessary a posteriori advocated in the text have the special 
character attributed to mathematical statements: Philosophical analysis tells us that 
they cannot be contingently true, so any empirical knowledge of their truth is auto-
matically empirical knowledge that they are necessary. This characterization ap-
plies, in particular, to the cases of identity statements and of essence. It may give a 
clue to a general characterization of a posteriori knowledge of necessary truths. 
(Kripke 1980: 159, emphasis in the original)5 
 
Thus, for example, while one cannot know a priori that it is necessary that Hesperus is 
Phosphorus, one can nevertheless know a priori that it is not contingent whether Hes-
perus is Phosphorus. 
While Kripke’s famous passage has no doubt encouraged optimism about 
principles like (*), Kripke was right to be cautious. (**) and thereby (*) face clear 
counterexamples due to C. Anthony Anderson (1993: 11-13). To modify one of An-
derson’s examples, consider, a necessary truth 𝜑N and a contingent truth 𝜑C such that 
a subject S knows a priori that it is not contingent whether 𝜑N, knows a priori that it is 
contingent whether 𝜑C, but is not in a position to know a priori whether 𝜑N or whether 𝜑C, so is not in a position to know a priori whether 𝜑N Ú 𝜑C. (‘𝜑N’ here could be re-
placed by any paradigm of the necessary a posteriori, such as ‘Hesperus is Phospho-
rus’.) Yet—suppose further—S knows, but not a priori, whether it is contingent 
whether 𝜑N Ú 𝜑C, by knowing whether 𝜑N. Since S is in a position to know a priori 
whether it is contingent whether 𝜑N Ú 𝜑C only if S is in a position to know a priori 
whether 𝜑N Ú 𝜑C, S is not in a position to know a priori whether it is contingent 
whether 𝜑N Ú 𝜑C, and the case is a counterexample to both (*) and (**). 
Anderson’s counterexamples to (*) involve replacing ‘𝜑’ with logically com-
plex (i.e., non-atomic) sentences. Unsurprisingly, this has encouraged the thought that 
true principles could be obtained by restricting (*) and other similar schematic princi-
ples to atomic sentences. Casullo (2018), for example, endorses a restriction of (**) to 
atomic sentences. Kipper (2017) takes on the project of trying to construct counterex-
amples to a similar principle restricted to atomic sentences. Rather than discuss Casul-
lo’s and Kipper’s principles separately, we will discuss a single principle that is not 
importantly different from them:6 
                                               
5 See also Kripke (1971: 153). 
6 Casullo’s principle is restricted to atomic sentences that express necessary truths. (See (KB) in Casul-
lo 2018, and see his n. 1 for the restriction to atomic sentences.) This introduces a complication that we 
discuss in n. 8. The principle that Kipper discusses is 
(ANC) The general modal status of any minimal sentential component of any G-necessary 
sentence can be known priori (Kipper 2017: 3).  
By ‘G-necessary’ Kipper means noncontingent (either necessarily true or necessarily false), and the 
‘general modal status’ of a sentence is either contingency or noncontingency. The principle, then, is 
this: If 𝜑 is noncontingent and 𝜓 is an atomic constituent of 𝜑, then it can be known a priori whether 𝜓 
is noncontingent. Note, however, that every atomic sentence is trivially an atomic constituent of a non-
contingent sentence. (For example, any sentence—and therefore any atomic sentence—𝜑 is a constitu-
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ATOMIC:  If S knows whether it is contingent whether 𝜑, then S is in a position to 
know a priori whether is contingent whether 𝜑, 
 
 where ‘𝜑’ is atomic. 
 
Kipper (2017) purports to have counterexamples to his variant of the above, but his 
examples are not entirely decisive. Each involves contentious assumptions concerning 
what is a priori knowable about natural kinds or—even more contentiously—a com-
bination of such assumptions with a commitment to Chalmersian epistemic two-
dimensionalist ideology (Chalmers 2006, 2010). If ATOMIC is false (i.e., has a false 
instance), one might hope to find a more decisive refutation. 
A more decisive refutation does exist, as we will show. Counterexamples to 
ATOMIC arise in any language that has at least two singular terms and at least one 
predicate for a reflexive or irreflexive relation whose reflexivity or irreflexivity (under 
the guise of that predicate) we are in a position to know a priori. There is no need to 
wade into debates about natural kind terms or to take on any epistemic two-
dimensionalist commitments in order to appreciate this fact, to which §2 is devoted. 
In §3 we will consider some natural proposals for even more restricted forms of (*), 
and we will show that the same examples that refute ATOMIC arise in different forms 
for those further restrictions, including a draconian restriction to atomic sentences 
with a one-place predicate that expresses a purely qualitative property. We cannot, of 
course, show that there are no true and non-trivial restrictions of ATOMIC, but in 
light of what we do show, we take it to be clear that any such restrictions must be so 
draconian that the resulting principles will be fairly uninteresting. The prospects for 
an a priori epistemology of modality in the spirit of Kripke’s famous passage thus 
look very dim indeed. 
 
2. Reflexive and irreflexive relations 
 
There are counterexamples to ATOMIC that are as clear as Kripke’s chief examples 
of the necessary a posteriori—namely, identity sentences. These involve predicates 
for certain relations whose modal features are intimately related to identity. In fact, as 
far as we can tell, all non-mathematical reflexive relations expressible by relatively 
simple verb phrases of English give rise to counterexamples to ATOMIC. Further-
more, very many non-mathematical irreflexive (i.e., anti-reflexive) relations expressi-
ble by relatively simple verb phrases in a natural language also give rise to counterex-
amples to ATOMIC. (Identity and distinctness, being logical relations, are also math-
ematical ones.) Here is an exercise: think of an English predicate for a non-
mathematical reflexive relation. It is likely that the predicate you thought of—call it 
‘R’—satisfies both (i) and (ii). 
 
(i) a = b iff it is not contingent whether aRb. 
                                                                                                                                      
ent of the noncontingent sentence 𝜑 Ú (𝜑 ® 𝜑).) (ANC), then, is equivalent to the principle that the 
general modal status of any atomic sentence can be known priori.  
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(ii) For some singular terms, ‘a’, ‘b’, we know that it is not contingent whether 
aRb, but we are not in a position to know a priori that it is not contingent 
whether aRb. 
 
But then, of course (by (ii)), we have a counterexample to ATOMIC. Here is another 
exercise: think of an English predicate for a non-mathematical irreflexive relation. It 
is quite likely that the predicate ‘R’ you thought of also satisfies (i) and (ii), and thus 
that we have a further counterexample to ATOMIC.  
 Let us consider some examples. The predicates for reflexive relations you are 
likely to have thought of have forms like ‘is at least as F as’, ‘has the same F as’, and 
‘are similarly F’. The predicates for irreflexive relations you are likely to have 
thought of have forms like ‘is more F than’, ‘is less F than’, and ‘have different Fs’. 
Now consider the following sentences. 
 
(1) Eminem is at least as tall as Marshall Mathers. 
 
(2) Eminem is at least as old as Marshall Mathers. 
 
(3) Eminem is more famous than Marshall Mathers. 
 
We are not in a position to know a priori whether it is contingent whether any of (1)–
(3) are true. Yet each is atomic, and we know that each is not contingent (because we 
know that Eminem is Marshall Mathers), so each is a counterexample to ATOMIC. 
(We cannot claim much originality here: Bird (2007: 176) uses examples similar to 
(1)-(3) to challenge (*). What seems not to have been noticed in the literature is that 
such examples show that restricting principles like (*) to atomic sentences won’t do.) 
This is not the end of the dialectical story, of course. An advocate of ATOMIC 
might try to resist these counterexamples in two ways. 
First, the advocate of ATOMIC might hope to avoid the counterexamples by 
arguing, on Millian grounds, that all true identities are knowable a priori.7 The idea is 
that, since (according to Millians) a singular term such as a proper name only contrib-
utes its referent to the propositions expressed by a sentence in which it occurs, ‘a = b’ 
and ‘a = a’ express the same proposition whenever the former is true, and since we 
are in a position to know the latter proposition a priori we are also in a position to 
know the former a priori. Arguably, then, we are in a position to know ‘a = b’ a priori 
when it is true, since the proposition it expresses is one that we are in a position to 
know a priori (under the guise of a different sentence: ‘a = a’). If so, we are in a posi-
tion to know the necessity of each of (1) and (2), since it follows deductively (and 
therefore a priori) from the a priori knowable truths: 
 
Eminem = Marshall Mathers 
 
If Eminem = Marshall Mathers, then it is necessary that Eminem is at least as 
tall as Marshall Mathers. 
                                               
7 Scott Soames (2002: 236-37) is a prominent defender of this view. Thanks to an anonymous referee 
for suggesting that we consider this objection. 
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If Eminem = Marshall Mathers, then it is necessary that Eminem is at least as 
old as Marshall Mathers. 
 
On this view, we are also in a position to know the impossibility of (3) a priori, be-
cause it is a deductive consequence of the a priori knowable fact that Eminem = Mar-
shall Mathers and the further a priori knowable fact: 
 
If Eminem = Marshall Mathers, then it is not possible that Eminem is more 
famous than Marshall Mathers. 
 
One could also argue from Millianism to the a priori knowability of the non-
contingency of (1)-(3) by noting that, according to Millianism, we preserve the prop-
osition expressed by each of (1)-(3) when we replace each occurrence of ‘Marshall 
Mathers’ in these sentences with an occurrence of ‘Eminem’. Such replacements 
yield: 
 
 Eminem is at least as tall as Eminem 
 
 Eminem is at least as old as Eminem 
 
 Eminem is more famous than Eminem, 
 
each of which we are in a position to know a priori to be non-contingent. 
We do not find this Millian line of thought very plausible, but no matter: even 
if it is correct, we will find counterexamples to ATOMIC among sentences of the 
same form as (1)-(3). Consider: 
 
(4) Eminem is at least as tall as Kanye West. 
 
(5) Eminem is at least as old as Kanye West. 
 
(6) Eminem is more famous than Kanye West. 
 
We know each of (4)-(6) to be contingent, but we are not in a position to know this a 
priori, because, for all we are in a position to know a priori, Eminem = Kanye West, 
in which case each of (4)-(6) is non-contingent.8 
 Second, someone might object to the counterexamples to ATOMIC on the 
grounds that (allegedly) natural language semantics teaches us that (1)-(6) are not 
atomic sentences, but existentially quantified sentences in which the existential quan-
                                               
8 These examples do not refute Casullo’s version of ATOMIC, which is restricted to necessary truths 
(see n. 7), but others involving proper names do, even assuming Millianism. Consider, for example, a 
sentence of the form ‘a was born prior to b’, where a is a biological parent of b. Given the necessity of 
biological parenthood ‘a was born prior to b’ will be a necessary truth but not knowable a priori to be 
noncontingent, contrary to Casullo’s principle. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this 
example.) 
 6 
tifier generalizes over states (such as the state of being more famous than Kanye 
West). It is far from clear that natural language semantics teaches us any such thing,9 
but let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that it does. Even at best, this objection 
would save the letter but not the spirit of ATOMIC and other similar principles. Pre-
sumably the philosophers who propose such principles have in mind sentences like 
(1)-(6) when they speak of ‘atomic sentences’, and accordingly they would think of 
the non-a-priori-knowability of the (non)contingency of each of (1)-(6) as a counter-
example to the principles they thought they were articulating. After all, according to 
the kind of semantic theory we have in mind hardly any natural language expression 
that we ordinarily call a ‘sentence’ is an atomic sentence, and it is not plausible that 
schematic principles like ATOMIC are intended to have no or virtually no instances 
where ‘𝜑’ is replaced by a natural language sentence. But, in any case, there is no 
hidden structure in formal languages, and formal languages with the syntax of first-
order logic provide a plethora of counterexamples to ATOMIC. 
 Indeed, it bears emphasis that virtually any non-trivial first-order theory that 
deals with contingent subject matter will provide counterexamples to ATOMIC. Vir-
tually any such theory will have at least one two-place predicate ‘R’ such that an 
atomic sentence ‘R(a, b)’ is noncontingent but not a priori knowably noncontingent 
when ‘a = b’ is true and is contingent but not a priori knowably contingent when ‘a = 
b’ is false. Such a predicate might, for example, express the relation of being at least 
as massive, which relates or fails to relate distinct individuals contingently and relates 
each individual to itself necessarily. 
 
3. Chasing woozles 
 
At this point the a priori modal epistemologist might try to restrict the principle still 
further. If a restriction to atomic sentences didn’t do the trick, why not try a restriction 
to atomic sentences of a particular form? Consider the following. 
 
MONADIC: If S knows whether it is contingent whether Pa, then S is in a position 
to know a priori whether it is contingent whether Pa,  
 
where ‘Pa’ is an atomic sentence formed by applying a one-place predicate to 
a singular term. 
 
Our observations about (1)-(6) do not immediately refute MONADIC. But consider 
the sentence 
 
                                               
9 The view that a sentence whose main verb is an event verb, such as  
Brutus killed Caesar 
has an existentially quantified logical form like 
$e(killing(e) Ù Subj(e, Brutus) Ù (Obj(e, Caesar)), 
is entirely mainstream (see Kratzer 2003), but the view that state sentences like (1)-(6) have an analo-
gous existentially quantified logical form is less so. Terence Parsons’ observation that ‘[t]here is … 
evidence in favour of the underlying state approach for state sentences, but there is not as much of it, 
and it is not as easy to evaluate, as the underlying event approach for event sentences’ (1990: 186) re-
mains a fair assessment of the evidence 28 years later. 
 7 
(3*)  lx(Eminem is more famous than x)(Marshall Mathers). 
 
(3*) is a counterexample to MONADIC if and only if (3) is a counterexample to 
ATOMIC—after all, (3*) is logically equivalent to (3). Note that further restricting 
MONADIC to sentences ‘Pa’ where ‘P’ is a simple predicate won’t help: there is 
nothing to stop us from introducing a simple predicate ‘F’ that expresses the property 
expressed by the complex predicate ‘lx(Eminem is more famous than x)’. If we do so, 
‘P(Marshall Mathers)’ will be a counterexample to the further restricted principle. 
There is, of course, something ‘artificial’ about such a predicate, but no matter: an 
artificial counterexample is still a counterexample. 
 The previous sentence may encourage some readers to consider restricting the 
principle even further, to sentences ‘Pa’ where ‘P’ is both simple and not ‘artificial’. 
This is not a promising strategy, for two reasons. First, it is extremely unclear what 
the new restriction means. Second, insofar as we have any idea about what ‘artificial’ 
would have to mean for the proposal to work, it seems highly plausible that there 
would be some counterexamples to MONADIC that involve predicates that are both 
simple and not ‘artificial’. Let ‘artificial’ mean something like ‘does not occur in any 
possible natural language or was introduced by a stipulative definition’. While it may 
be difficult to imagine the property expressed by ‘lx(Eminem is more famous than x)’ 
being lexicalized in any natural language except by means of a stipulative definition, 
actual natural languages contain many non-stipulatively defined one-place predi-
cates—such as ‘French’—that express properties that things have or lack in virtue of 
being related in some particular way to some contingently existing object—such as 
France. Perhaps, for all we know (assuming that France = Gaul), ‘Gaul is French’ is a 
counterexample to the envisioned restriction of MONADIC.10 And if it isn’t one, it 
would be astonishing if there were not a similar counterexample in some possible nat-
ural language. 
 But one might well think that what makes any counterexamples to MONADIC 
work is not the ‘artificiality’ of the predicates involved but their non-qualitativeness. 
A natural further restriction to MONADIC suggests itself: restrict the principle to sen-
tences ‘Pa’ where ‘P’ is simple and expresses a purely qualitative property. The re-
sulting principle is so weak as to be fairly devoid of interest, but never mind that—is 
it true? 
 The answer is clearly ‘No’: Let ‘Marshall’ name the proposition that Eminem 
is at least as tall as Marshall Mathers. Truth is a qualitative property if anything is, 
and so the sentence ‘Marshall is true’ is a counterexample to the new principle if and 
only if (3) is a counterexample to ATOMIC. 
 And again, one should resist the temptation to throw in an additional anti-
‘artificiality’ condition. While ‘Marshall’ may be ‘artificial’, natural languages con-
tain many non-stipulatively introduced names for propositions: ‘Marxism’, for exam-
ple, at least on one disambiguation, refers to a proposition (although it is very unclear 
                                               
10 Of course, if ‘Gaul’ is understood as referring to a certain territory, it is plausible that we are in a 
position to know a priori that ‘Gaul is French’ is contingent. But suppose instead that ‘Gaul’ and 
‘France’ refer to the same country. On that interpretation it seems that, for all we are in a position to 
know a priori, ‘Gaul is French’ might be contingent in the way ‘The Congo is Belgian’ is. 
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which one)—a thing that we can deny, accept, and take other propositional attitudes 
towards. 
 The idea that the epistemology of modality is in some sense a priori is a popu-
lar one. We have seen that trying to precisify this idea by (*) and various natural re-
strictions of it hopeless. Of course we are not in a position to say that there is no way 
of restricting (*) so that it comes out true. Trivially, any schema with false instances 
can be restricted so that it has only true instances—the limiting case of a restriction 
that leaves it with no instances guarantees this. But we take the foregoing reflections 
on increasingly draconian restrictions of (*) to pretty clearly show that any true re-
striction of (*) will be so weak as to be devoid of epistemological interest, and that 
post-Kripkean advocates of a priori modal epistemology are well advised to look 
elsewhere for a vindication of their grand vision. 
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